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In November 1988 the California Supreme Court upheld the pros-
ecution of Laurie Walker for the death of her four-year-old daughter
Shauntay based on allegations that she was criminally negligent in car-
ing for the child.' During her daughter's seventeen-day illness, later
diagnosed as meningitis, Walker did not seek conventional medical
care, but rather treated her daughter solely with prayer. 2 Following
the tenets of her religion, the Church of Christ, Scientist (Christian
Science Church),3 Walker called upon a Christian Science practitioner
and a Christian Science nurse to pray for and attend her daughter.4
Walker was charged with felony child endangerment 5 and
* Member, Third Year Class; B.A. 1987, University of Virginia.
1. Walker v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 3d 112, 118-19, 763 P.2d 852, 855, 253 Cal. Rptr.
1, 4 (1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 905 (1989).
2. Id. at 114, 763 P.2d at 855, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 4.
3. Id. at 119 n.1, 763 P.2d at 855 n.1, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 4 n.l. Members of the Christian
Science Church reject the concept of human illness, believing that diseases do not exist but
instead are errors of the mind. They shun traditional medical treatment and use prayer as a
means of seeking the "divine truth" that will cure the mind's error. See Note, Faith Healing
Exemptions to Child Protection Laws: Keeping the Faith Versus Medical Care for Children,
12 J. LEGIS. 243, 243 n.3 (1985) (authored by Wayne F. Malecha) [hereinafter Note, Faith
Healing Exemptions]; Note, Religious Beliefs and the Criminal Justice System: Some Problems
of the Faith Healer, 8 Loy. L.A.L. R-v. 396, 397 n.7 (1975) (authored by Catherine W.
Laughran) [hereinafter Note, Religious Beliefs].
4. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 119 n.1, 763 P.2d at 855 n.1, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 4 n.1. The
court explained that "[Christian Science practitioners are] individuals who devote their full
time to healing through prayer, or spiritual treatment.... Christian Scientists may also call
upon the services of a Christian Science nurse, who provides such practical care as dressing
of wounds for those having spiritual treatment." Id. at 119 n.2, 763 P.2d at 855 n.2, 253
Cal. Rptr. at 4 n.2 (quoting amicus curiae brief of the Christian Science Church). For a brief
description of the events leading up to the child's death, see Note, California's Prayer Healing
Dilemma, 14 HAsI NGs CoNsT. L.Q. 395, 395 (1987) (authored by JoAnna A. Gekas) [here-
inafter Note, California's Prayer Healing], and Note, Walker v. Superior Court: Religious
Convictions May Bring Felony Convictions, 21 PAc. L.J. 1069, 1083 (1990).
-5. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273a(1) (West 1988). The statute provides in relevant part:
Any person who, under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily
harm or death, willfully causes or permits any child to suffer, or inflicts thereon
unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, or having the care or custody of any
child, willfully causes or permits the person or health of such child to be injured,
or willfully causes or permits such child to be placed in such situation that its person
or health is endangered, is punishable by imprisonment in the county jail not
exceeding one year, or in the state prison for 2, 4, or 6 years.
Id.
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involuntary manslaughter 6 for failing to seek medical care during her
child's fatal illness.7 The court rejected her contention that the ex-
emption for spiritual treatment 8 found in section 270 of the California
Penal Code, 9 a misdemeanor child protection statute, provided an ab-
solute defense to any prosecution for criminal neglect, whether under
section 270 or the felony laws under which Walker was charged. 0 The
court further rejected Walker's defense that her conduct was abso-
lutely protected from liability under the first amendment free exercise
clause.
The Walker-majority failed to announce a rational and consistent
law that will at once protect innocent children from neglect and pre-
serve the freedoms of conscience guaranteed to their parents by the
first amendment. The court admitted that spiritual treatment under
section 270 "represent[s] an alternative to medical attendance under
the terms of . . . [that section] ,' 12 concluding "that section 270 ex-
empts parents who utilize prayer treatment from the statutory re-
quirement to furnish medical care."" The majority refused, however,
6. CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West 1988). The statute provides in relevant part:
Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice. It is of
three kinds:
(b) Involuntary-in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony;
or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful
manner, or without due caution and circumspection ....
Id.
7. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 118-19, 763 P.2d at 855-56, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 4-5.
8. For the purposes of this Note, "spiritual treatment" and "faith healing" are used
interchangeably to describe the use of prayer, faith, or other spiritual means to treat illness
in lieu of the more common reliance on orthodox methods of medical science.
9. The statute provides in relevant part:
If a parent of a minor child willfully omits, without lawful excuse, to furnish
necessary clothing, food, shelter or medical attendance, or other remedial care for
his or her child, he or she is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine not
exceeding two thousand dollars ($2,000), or by imprisonment in the county jail not
exceeding one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment.... If a parent provides
a minor with treatment by spiritual means through prayer alone in accordance with
the tenets and practices of a recognized church or religious denomination, by a duly
accredited practitioner thereof, such treatment shall constitute "other remedial care",
as used in this section.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1988) (emphasis added).
10. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 129, 763 P.2d at 862-63, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 11-12.
11. Id. at 141, 763 P.2d at 871, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 20. For a discussion of the Walker
court's treatment of Laurie Walker's free exercise claims, see infra Parts II.B.-C.
12. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 122, 763 P.2d at 857, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 6.
13. Id. at 123, 763 P.2d at 858, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 7. The Walker court did not decide
and this Note does not address the question of whether § 270 violates the establishment clause
of the first amendment or the California Constitution. An argument can be made that § 270
does violate the establishment clause See id. at 148, 763 P.2d at 876, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 25
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to extend the statutory defense to prosecutions for felony child en-
dangerment and involuntary manslaughter.1 4 The result protects par-
ents who seek spiritual treatment for their children as long as the
children are not truly sick; otherwise, these parents had better hope
their god is listening. Unlike parents who choose orthodox medical
care for their children, parents who rely on spiritual treatment for their
sick children now face potential criminal liability if the child is not
cured.
In rejecting Walker's first amendment claims, the court relied on
the United States Supreme Court's distinction between religious be-
liefs, which are absolutely protected under the first amendment, and
religiously motivated conduct, which receives only qualified protec-
tion.'5 Citing this distinction, the court divorced Walker's beliefs from
her conduct of providing spiritual care in lieu of orthodox medical
treatment for her daughter.16 After stating simply that courts evaluate
criminal negligence with reference to objective standards of reason-
ableness, the Walker court turned to the only remaining question:
Whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have
acted as the defendant did.17
Such an approach, however, fails to recognize the unique char-
acter of free exercise protections and ultimately sanctions the indi-
vidual for her belief.' To the extent an objective standard of criminal
negligence requires the trier of fact to examine the faith healing par-
(Mosk, J., concurring); Note, California's Prayer Healing, supra note 4, at 412-14. Cf. Note,
When Rights Clash: The Conflict Between A Parent's Right to Free Exercise of Religion
Versus His Child's Right to Life, 19 Cuis. L. REV. 585, 596-97 (1989) (authored by John T.
Gathings, Jr.) [hereinafter Note, When Rights Clash] (discussing State v. Miskimens, 22 Ohio
Misc. 2d 43, 490 N.E.2d 931 (1984), which held a similar statutory exemption violative of the
establishment clause); Note, Parental Failure to Provide Child with Medical Assistance Based
on Religious Beliefs Causing Child's Death-Involuntary Manslaughter in Pennsylvania, 90
DicK. L. REv. 861, 887-88 (1986) (authored by Daniel J. Kearney) [hereinafter Note, Parental
Failure] (generally discussing difficulties with the establishment clause and religious exemptions).
Regarding the Supreme Court's establishment clause decisions, one commentator has la-
mented, "The Supreme Court would not recognize an establishment of religion if it took life
and bit the Justices." Smith, Separation and the 'Secular'" Reconstructing the Disestablishment
Decision, 67 Tax. L. REv. 955, 956 n.1 (1989) (quoting L. LEVY, Tan ESTABLISM NT CLAUSE:
RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 163 (1986)).
14. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 151, 763 P.2d at 878, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 27 (Broussard, J.,
dissenting in part). In his dissent, Justice Broussard argued that § 273a (felony endangerment)
applies only to "active conduct endangering the child" and because prayer healing does not
constitute "active conduct," he would have extended the section 270 exemption for spiritual
treatment to section 273a.
15. For a discussion of the belief-conduct distinction, see infra Part I.A.
16. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 139, 763 P.2d at 869-70, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
17. Id. at 136, 763 P.2d at 868, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
18. At least one commentator has characterized the "belief-action" dichotomy as "at best
an oversimplification." L. TamE, AmEzucA CONsnTrmoNAL LAW 1184 (2d ed. 1988).
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ent's knowledge, or to impute to that parent the knowledge of a
"reasonable person," it infringes on the parent's absolutely protected
religious beliefs. It is not possible to determine the objective reason-
ableness of Laurie Walker's conduct of relying solely on spiritual treat-
ment without determining the reasonableness of her belief in the power
of prayer as a healer. Such a determination violates the Supreme Court's
consistent holding that religious belief is absolutely protected under
the free exercise clause of the first amendment. 9
This Note contends that the California Supreme Court should
have barred Walker's prosecution for felony child endangerment and
involuntary manslaughter. Moreover, this Note argues that prosecu-
tions for criminal negligence based on parents' spiritual treatment of
their children that do not consider the defendants' subjective belief
in the power of prayer to heal violate the first amendment's free ex-
ercise clause. Part I discusses the United States Supreme Court's free
exercise cases that establish the belief-conduct distinction. This Part
also examines the difficulties of satisfactorily defining "religion," the
subject of free exercise protection. Without a workable definition of
religion, it is impossible to determine which beliefs and actions are
protected by the free exercise clause. Part II uses Walker v. Superior
Court to analyze religiously motivated treatment cases in an attempt
to find a consistent application of the United States Supreme Court's
free exercise doctrines to the spiritual treatment of ill children. Par-
ticular attention is given to California's objective standard for criminal
negligence. Part III discusses the incompatibility of that objective stan-
dard with first amendment free exercise rights. This Part concludes
that the rhetorical belief-conduct distinction, as applied in Walker, is
hollow protection and ultimately leaves free exercise protections vul-
nerable to restriction by the state at all levels.
I. Background on First Amendment Religious Freedoms
The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides,
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.' '20 Though the amendment was
19. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The California Constitution provides similar protection for
the free exercise of religion. It states in relevant part:
Free exercise and enjoyment of religion without discrimination or preference are
guaranteed. This liberty of conscience does not excuse acts that are licentious or
inconsistent with the peace or safety of the State.
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4. See generally Note, California's Prayer Healing, supra note 4, at 409
(discussing independent state grounds for free exercise claims in California).
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written in absolute terms-"Congress shall make no law"-United
States Supreme Court decisions have limited the amendment's pro-
tections. In fact, without limitations the two proscriptions-the first
against laws establishing religion and the second against laws prohib-
iting the free exercise of religion-would come into direct conflict. 21
To the extent that the state must recognize the religious nature of a
belief or practice in order to avoid infringing upon it, one could argue
that the state is accommodating that belief or practice in an uncon-
stitutional establishment of religion. Thus, pure nonestablishment might
be complete neutrality, and neutrality necessarily would be indifferent
to restrictions on the exercise of religion.-
The contours of first amendment free exercise protection can be
outlined by several key decisions of the United States Supreme Court
spanning more than 100 years. While the Court appeared to be moving
in the direction of heightening religious protections, several recent cases
have stunted movement in that direction. In fact, the Court appears
to have limited severely the freedoms afforded by the free exercise
clause. The limits that the Court has established for free exercise will
determine the extent to which parents are allowed to choose spiritual
treatment for their ill children in lieu of orthodox medical care.
A. Free Exercise Under the First Amendment
(1) Development of the Sherbert Compelling Interest Standard
In 1878 the United States Supreme Court for the first time rec-
ognized the belief-conduct distinction relating to first amendment pro-
tection. In Reynolds v. United States,23 the Court refused to recognize
a religious defense to a bigamy conviction. 24 In interpreting the first
amendment, the Court stated, "Congress was deprived of all legis-
lative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions which
[are] in violation of social duties or subversive of good order."' 25 The
21. See L. TmE, supra note 18, at 1157; Smith, supra note 13, at 990-93.
22. L. TRmaE, supra note 18, at 1167-68; but cf. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409
(1963) ('!the governmental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences ... does
not represent that involvement of religious with secular institutions which it is the object of
the Establishment Clause to forestall.").
23. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
24. When Reynolds was decided, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (the
Mormon Church) accepted the doctrine that male members of the church had a duty to
practice polygamy. Id. at 161. "Bigamy" involves an illegal second marriage. "Polygamy" is
the offense of having several marriages, or more than one spouse, at the same time. BLAcKl's
LAw DicTioNARY 1159 (6th ed. 1990).
25. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164 (emphasis added).
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Court found that a law regulating so fundamental a part of society
as marriage was not prohibited by the Constitution, and that per-
mitting an individual to violate that law because of professed religious
beliefs would "permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.''
Relying on evidence of western traditions viewing polygamy with dis-
favor and a history of antibigamy laws, 27 the Reynolds Court rejected
the argument that polygamy was a protected religious belief that could
justify "an overt act made criminal by the law of the land. ' 28 Reynolds
thus distinguished an absolutely protected religious belief from wholly
unprotected practices motivated by that belief.29
Sixty-two years later in Cantwell v. Connecticut,3° the Supreme
Court held that first amendment protections apply to the states through
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and reaffirmed
the Reynolds distinction between the freedom to believe and the free-
dom to act: "The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the
second cannot be." ' 31 The Court established, however, that in regu-
lating religious conduct, the state must not unduly burden that relig-
ious belief.32 Cantwell involved Jehovah's Witnesses who were convicted
for soliciting religious contributions without approval from local au-
thorities as required by a state statute. 3 The Court found that the
statute as applied to the defendants violated the free exercise clause
because the right to solicit was conditioned upon a state officer's de-
termination that the cause was religious. 34 While the Court held that
the state was free to protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitations35
and to regulate solicitation generally "in the interest of public safety,
peace, comfort or convenience, "36 it concluded that conditioning the
defendants' solicitation on the state officer's finding of a religious
cause was too burdensome on the defendants' free exercise of religion.
Thus, Cantwell limited the state's power to regulate religiously mo-
tivated conduct: that power "must be so exercised as not . . unduly
to infringe the protected freedom." ' 37
26. Id. at 167.
27. Id. at 164-66.
28. Id. at 162.
29. Id. at 166; see also Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890) (upholding an Idaho
antibigamy statute against a free exercise defense).
30. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
31. Id. at 303-04.
32. Id. at 304.
33. Id. at 301-02.
34. Id. at 305.
35. Id. at 306.
36. Id. at 307.
37. Id. at 304; see also Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) (holding that
1496 THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42
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The Court further protected the practice of religious beliefs in
Sherbert v. Verner,38 holding that only a compelling state interest can
justify substantially burdening an individual's free exercise rights. 39 In
Sherbert, a member of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church was denied
state unemployment benefits after she was discharged for refusing to
work on Saturday. 40 She challenged the denial of benefits as an im-
permissible violation of her first amendment rights. Finding that the
denial of unemployment benefits did impose a substantial burden on
the appellant's exercise of religion, 41 the Court next questioned whether
South Carolina had some compelling state interest to justify its denial
of benefits. 42 Rejecting the state's suggestion that the possibility of
"fraudulent claims by ... claimants feigning religious objections to
Saturday work" 43 justified the burden on the appellant, the Court found
no compelling interest to justify the state-imposed burden on the ap-
pellant's religious practice." Moreover, even if the threat of fraudulent
claims was compelling, the Court stated that "it would plainly be in-
cumbent upon the appellees to demonstrate that no alternative forms
of regulation would combat such abuses without infringing First
Amendment rights." '45 Thus, Sherbert solidified the so-called "least
restrictive alternative" 46 requirement for state regulation of religious
conduct to which the Court had referred in Cantwell.47
The Court applied the principles of Sherbert in Wisconsin v.
Yoder" and found that the state's interest in compulsory education
did not outweigh the burden such a regulation would place on the free
exercise rights of the Amish. 49 Wisconsin's compulsory school atten-
the state must utilize the "least restrictive means" available in promoting its compelling
interests.)
38. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
39. Id. at 403.
40. Members of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church are prohibited from working on
Saturday, their sabbath. Id. at 399 & n.1. In Sherbert, the state had found the appellant
ineligible for state unemployment benefits because she refused to accept employment that
required Saturday work. Id. at 401.
41. Id. at 403.
42. Id. at 406.
43. Id. at 407.
44. Id. at 406-09; see also Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (overturning a
state's denial of unemployment benefits to a Jehovah's Witness who quit his job because of
religious convictions after being transferred to an area that manufactured tank gun turrets).
45. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407 (emphasis added).
46. See L. TRmE, supra note 18, at 1256.
47. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306-07, 311 (1940); supra notes 30-37 and
accompanying text.
48. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
49. Id. at'234-36. As members of the Old Order Amish community, the respondents in
July 1991]
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dance law required that the defendants' children continue in public
or private school until the age of sixteen. The defendants' children
were fourteen and fifteen, and they had completed the eighth grade.
The defendants chose not to send their children to school for the one
or two years that remained before the children were beyond the reach
of the statute. The defendants were tried and convicted under the state
statute.50 Having stated that "only those interests of the highest order
and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to
the free exercise of religion, ' 51 the Court held that the state's interest
in compulsive education did not outweigh the burden on the defen-
dants' free exercise of religion. 52 The Court concluded that the state's
interests in the physical and mental health of the children and their
ability to become self-supporting were satisfied by the continued vo-
cational education the children would receive at home.53
The Supreme Court has maintained two areas, then, for which
the first amendment provides differing levels of religious protection:
religious beliefs and religious conduct motivated by those beliefs. An
individual's religious beliefs, her personal thoughts and convictions,
are beyond the reach of state intrusion; but conduct remains within
the state's power to regulate, if only upon a showing of compelling
state interest, despite its religious nature. The distinction between be-
lief and conduct becomes crucial to the free exercise protection of faith
healing parents.5 4
(2) The Coercion Standard: The Other Side of the Coin
In denying several free exercise claims following Sherbert, the Su-
preme Court addressed the claims by asking not whether the state had
Yoder believed that sending their children to public high schools was contrary to their religion
and would threaten their children's salvation. Id. at 209. The Supreme Court noted that the
Amish "view[ed] secondary school education as an impermissible exposure of their children
to a 'worldly' influence in conflict with their beliefs." Id. at 211.
5O. Id. at 207-08.
51. Id. at 215; see Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (stating that "any
incidental burden on the free exercise of appellant's religion may be justified by a 'compelling
state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional power to regu-
late . . . ."') (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)); Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944) (recognizing that a parent's conflict with the state over control of
her child and the child's training involved balancing the parent's "sacred private interests"
with the societal interest in safeguarding children from abuses).
52. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234-36.
53. Id.
54. See infra Parts II.B.-C.
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"accommodated" 55 the claimant's religious practices, but rather
whether the state had "coerced" the claimant into actions violating
her religious belief.56 In taking this approach, the Court has denied
any inconsistency with the Sherbert compelling interest standard.57 Even
assuming that the Court has followed the Sherbert analysis by re-
framing the question, the Court in effect has reduced the burden re-
quired of the state to justify its intrusion.
In Bowen v. Roy,55 the Supreme Court permitted the enforcement
of a federal administrative provision, requiring that recipients of Aid
to Families with Dependent Children provide social security numbers
for all members of their household. 59 Two Native American parents
claimed that obtaining a social security number for their daughter would
violate their "religious belief that control over one's life is essential
to spiritual purity," because once the number was issued, their daugh-
ter would not be able to maintain control over the state's use of it. °
After acknowledging the distinction between the absolute protection
of belief and the qualified protection of conduct, 61 the Court con-
cluded that the social security requirement in "a uniformly applicable
statute neutral on its face [was] of a wholly different, less intrusive
nature than affirmative compulsion" of religious conduct. 62 Thus, be-
cause the federal government merely refused to accommodate the par-
ents' religion by exempting them from the requirement, and did not
compel or coerce them into violating their religious beliefs, the Court
held that the requirement did not violate the first amendment.
In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association,6
the Supreme Court followed Roy and refused to enjoin construction
of a logging road through federal land that would have intruded upon
an area of wilderness held sacred by several Native American tribes.
The Court drew a parallel between the Indians' claims to the sacred
land and the Roy parents' challenge to the requirement that they ob-
55. Use of the term "accommodation" refers merely to those instances discussed above
when the Court has ordered the state to exempt individuals from certain regulations that
burdened their free exercise of religion. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)
(exempting members of the Old Order Amish from Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance
law); see also L. TamE, supra note 18, at 1168 n.12 (describing "practices or policies whereby
government steps aside or creates an exemption in order to produce free exercise neutrality").
56. See Supreme Court-Leading Cases, 102 HAnv. L. Rnv. 143, 233, 236 (1988).
57. See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699-700 (1986).
58. Id. at 693.
59. Id. at 698.
60. Id. at 696.
61. Id. at 699.
62. Id. at 704.
63. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
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tain a social security number for their daughter. 64 As in Roy, the Court
in Lyng refused to find a free exercise protection that would allow
the claimants effectively to control the federal government's "internal
affairs.' '65 The Court explained, "In neither case . .. would the af-
fected individuals be coerced by the Government's action into violating
their religious beliefs.'' 66 The decision in Lyng is significant because
the Court did not claim to be departing from established precedent. 67
Instead, by focusing on the coercion standard in Roy, the Lyng ma-
jority avoided the Sherbert compelling interest standard. The Court
explained that the Sherbert decision "[did] not and cannot imply that
incidental effects of government programs, . . . which have no ten-
dency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious be-
liefs, require government to bring forward a compelling justification
for its otherwise lawful actions." 68 Quoting from Justice Douglas's
concurring opinion in Sherbert, the Court described the applicable
coercion standard: "[T]he Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of
what the government cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what
the individual can exact from the government." 69 By thus reframing
the issue, the Court feigned consistency with its free exercise prece-
dent. Nonetheless, this artificial bright line between state coercion and
state non-interference has left unpopular religious beliefs vulnerable
to not-so-neutral statutes of general applicability. One properly might
ask: had the belief in the power of social security numbers to rob one
of one's spirit been a mainstream religious belief, would the court not
have come out on the "impermissible state intrusion" side of free ex-
ercise analysis and granted the belief first amendment protection, if
only by requiring a showing of compelling government interest?
(3) The Demise of Sherbert
In 1990, the Supreme Court decided the fate of the Sherbert com-
pelling interest standard in Employment Division v. Smith.70 While
64. Id. at 448-49.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 449 (emphasis added). But see Note, Pursuing Native American Rights in
International Venues: A Jus Cogens Strategy After Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Association, 42 HASINGs L.J. 591 (1991) (authored by Christopher P. Cline) (arguing
that the Supreme Court's decision amounted to a violation of international human rights
because it effectively would have destroyed a religion).
67. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 450-51, 456-57.
68. Id. at 450-51.
69. Id. at 451 (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 412 (1963) (Douglas, J.,
concurring)). It should be noted that the Roy Court also quoted Justice Douglas. Bowen v.
Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 700 (1986).
70. 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
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continuing to disclaim any departure from the Sherbert free exercise
protections, 71 the Smith Court substantially modified the nature of
first amendment protection afforded to religiously motivated conduct.
Smith involved two members of the Native American Church who
were fired from their jobs with a private drug rehabilitation organ-
ization when their employer learned that they had ingested peyote as
part of a religious ceremony.7 2 The Oregon Employment Division de-
nied their applications for unemployment benefits because they had
been fired for work-related "misconduct." 73 The respondents claimed
that this denial violated their free exercise rights under the United States
Constitution.
In addressing the respondents' religious claims, the United States
Supreme Court ultimately focused on the legality of the respondents'
peyote use. Because the Oregon Supreme Court determined that the
respondents' actions were criminal under state law, the United States
Supreme Court concluded that the denial of benefits did not violate
their free exercise rights.74 The Smith Court held that the first amend-
ment "does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with
a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that
the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes
(or proscribes)."' 75
71. The Smith Court reaffirmed the distinction between the absolute protection given
religious beliefs and the qualified protection given belief-motivated conduct: "Mhe First
Amendment obviously excludes all 'governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such."' Id.
at 1599 (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963)).
72. Id. at 1596. Respondents used peyote as a religious sacrament in a ceremony of the
Native American Church. Peyote is an hallucinogen that grows in small buds on the Lophophora
williamsii, a small, spineless cactus. It plays a central role in the Church's ceremonies and
practices. Church theology combines Christianity with a belief that the plant embodies the
Holy Spirit and that those who take the drug come into direct contact with God. People v.
Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 720, 394 P.2d 813, 816-17, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 72-73 (1964).
73. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1596. The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the state agency's
holding on the grounds that it violated the respondents' free exercise rights under the United
States Constitution. Id. The Oregon Supreme Court rejected the state's claim that the agency's
holding did not violate the first amendment because peyote use was prohibited by state criminal
law. Id. The state supreme court found the illegality of the respondents' actions irrelevant
because the "misconduct" standard applied by the state agency was not intended to enforce
state criminal laws. Id. At this point the case history becomes complicated. On its first
appearance before the United States Supreme Court, Smith was remanded for a state court
determination of the criminality of respondents' religiously motivated peyote use. Id. at 1598.
485 U.S. 660, 673 (1988). The Oregon Supreme Court found that the state criminal law
provided no exemption for religious use of peyote and, therefore, held that the prohibition
violated the first amendment. 307 Or. 68, 763 P.2d 146 (1988). The United States Supreme
Court again granted certiorari. 489 U.S. 1077 (1989).
74. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1606.
75. Id. at 1600 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)).
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Although reminiscent of the Court's language in Sherbert,76 Justice
Scalia's majority opinion in Smith rejects Sherbert's requirement that
"governmental actions that substantially burden a religious practice
must be justified by a compelling governmental interest. ' 77 Conse-
quently, Smith significantly narrows the scope of free exercise pro-
tections.
The Smith Court justified this holding by first pointing out that
the Supreme Court never had struck down governmental actions on
the basis of Sherbert outside the area of unemployment compensa-
tion.71 Second, the only cases in which the Court previously had found
the first amendment to bar application of "a neutral, generally ap-
plicable law to religiously motivated action" were those involving other
constitutional claims in addition to free exercise.79 These "hybrid"
claims involve, for instance, free exercise and free speech, 80 or free
exercise reinforced by the assertion of parental rights."' The Smith
majority explained that courts have given greater protection to relig-
ious freedom in these instances than in cases involving an exclusive
assertion of the constitutional right to practice religion free from gov-
ernmental interference. The Court concluded, therefore, that a free
exercise claim standing alone, like that of the Native Americans before
the Court, did not merit the heightened protection given to "hybrid"
claims or the protection of the compelling interest standard given to
free exercise claims in the context of unemployment compensation. 2
Although Justice Scalia denied that the Smith decision departed
from settled free exercise precedents, the majority all but decimated
former first amendment protection of religiously motivated conduct.83
After Smith, the free exercise clause does not prohibit governmental
action that has merely the "incidental effect" of burdening religious
conduct-no matter how severe the burden. The Smith majority ex-
plained:
Whatever may be the exact line between unconstitutional prohibitions
on the free exercise of religion and the legitimate conduct by gov-
76. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) ("the Court has rejected challenges
under the Free Exercise Clause to governmental regulation of certain overt acts prompted by
religious beliefs or principles").
77. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1602-06 (quoting Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402-03).
78. Id. at 1602.
79. Id. at 1601-02.
80. Id. at 1601 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)).
81. Id. (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)).
82. Id. at 1602-03.
83. See id. at 1602-06; cf. id. at 1607 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) ("To
reach this sweeping result ... the Court must not only give a strained reading of the First
Amendment but must also disregard our consistent application of free exercise doctrine .....
84. Id. at 1602-06.
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ernment..., the location of the line cannot depend on measuring
the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector's spiritual
development....
Even if we assume that ... the [logging] road will 'virtually
destroy the ... Indians' ability to practice their religion,' the Con-
stitution simply does not provide a principle that could justify up-
holding respondents' [free exercise] claims."'
The Court held that the Oregon statute criminalizing peyote use was
valid because it applied generally to all persons using peyote, and the
statute's burden on members of the Native American Church was only
"incidental" to the statute's general reach. 8 Thus, after Smith, the
first amendment protects religiously motivated conduct only from gov-
ernmental action that is primfirily directed toward the religious nature
of the activity.8 7
Following Smith, then, it appears that the Sherbert standard re-
quiring a compelling interest to justify state interference with an in-
dividual's religious conduct has been limited to the unemployment
compensation context.88 The protection that remains for religiously
motivated conduct is merely the freedom from state coercion applied
in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association.9 The
state may not coerce or compel an individual to act in violation of
her religious beliefs, but as the Smith Court held, an individual cannot
avoid the requirements of a neutral and generally applicable law sim-
ply because the law has the incidental effect of infringing upon the
individual's religious practices. 9°
Significantly, however, the Smith majority left open the possi-
bility that parents who choose to treat their children with prayer may
have a "hybrid" claim involving free exercise in conjunction with a
claim to parental rights that still will merit heightened protection. 91 The
burden imposed on the state by this heightened protection is unclear
and presumably would be something less than the Sherbert compelling
interest-least restrictive means standard. And despite the significant
limits it placed on the free exercise protections for religiously moti-
vated conduct, the Supreme Court in Smith maintained at least the
rhetoric of an absolute protection for religious beliefs.92
85. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 485 U.S. 439, 451-52
(1988).
86. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1602.
87. Id. at 1599-1600.
88. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
89. 485 U.S. 439 (1988); see supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
90. See supra text accompanying notes 75, 84.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 79-81.
92. See supra text accompanying note 78.
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B. Defining "Religion"
Once the Court has established a constitutional scheme for pro-
tecting the free exercise of religion, the task remains to define the scope
of the protection. Because religion involves personal matters of con-
science, a precise definition that accounts for all faiths and beliefs is
impossible. If everyone subscribed to the same religious beliefs and
completely agreed on the interpretation of those common beliefs, 93
first amendment free exercise protection would be unnecessary. Every
citizen, every legislator, every jury member, every prosecutor, and every
judge would agree on the priority to be given to each belief. The una-
nimity of religion would protect and preserve those commonly held
beliefs and the rights of those who profess them. But this is not the
society in which we live.94 The Supreme Court has said, therefore, that
"religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or com-
prehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection." 91
Against this background, courts strive to resolve the conflict between
seemingly absurd notions, offered as religious beliefs, and the first
amendment protection afforded to them almost because of their per-
ceived absurdity.
(1) Judicial Approaches to Defining Religion
The inherent difficulties in defining "religion" under the first
amendment are illustrated by the Supreme Court's conscientious ob-
jector cases. In these cases, the Court has confronted problems in the
interpretation of the Universal Military Training and Service Act (Mil-
itary Service Act), 96 which excuses from military service persons who
object based on their religious beliefs. As with cases involving first
amendment free exercise claims, the Court has attempted to define the
boundaries of the rights afforded by the statute's reference to religious
beliefs.
In United States v. Seeger,97 the Court was faced with interpreting
a section of the Military Service Act that exempted from combat serv-
ice military personnel opposed to participation in war because of their
religious training and beliefs. 98 That section defined "religious training
93. A recent episode of a popular talk-show demonstrated the fact that even among those
of the same faith, there is a significant diversity of interpretations. Oprah (syndicated television
broadcast, Apr. 10, 1991).
94. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1991, at A-I, col. 1.
95. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981).
96. 50 U.S.C. § 456(j) (1982).
97. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
98. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 164-65.
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and belief" as "belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties
superior to those arising from any human relation. '" 99 The district courts
denied the conscientious objectors' claims because they did not present
their convictions expressly in relation to some "Supreme Being."''
One defendant relied on his belief in "goodness and virtue for their
own sakes ... without belief in God, except in the remotest sense." 101
Another claimed that his opposition to war was based on his belief
in "the Supreme Reality,"' 1° and a third stated simply that his ob-
jection was based on a moral code that was superior to any obligation
to the state.10 3
Finding that all three qualified for the exemption from military serv-
ice, the Supreme Court read the Military Service Act's reference to
a "Supreme Being" broadly and held that the exception extended to
all sincere religious beliefs which are based upon a power or being,
or upon a faith, to which all else is subordinate or upon which all
else is ultimately dependent. The test might be stated in these words:
A sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its pos-
sessor a place parallel to that filled by ... [an orthodox belief in]
God. o4
The Court's logic was circular, defining a "religious belief" as a belief
that can be understood by referring to orthodox religious principles.
This result is desirable, however, because it recognizes that individuals
may articulate their beliefs differently and that courts must determine
"whether [those beliefs] are, in ... [that person's] own scheme of
things, religious. '"' 105
The Court embraced and expanded upon Seeger's reasoning in
another conscientious objector case involving the Military Service Act.
In Welsh v. United States, 106the Court analyzed whether the professed
beliefs "play the role of a religion and function as a religion in the
... [individual's] life."' The Court then extended Seeger's already
broad reading of religion. It stated that even the individual's own char-
acterization of his beliefs as "nonreligious" should not necessarily
undermine the application of the conscientious objector exception.0 8
99. Id. at 173 (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 4560) (1982)); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 216 (1971) (purely secular philosophies not protected).
100. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 166-69.
101. Id. at 166.
102. Id. at 167.
103. Id. at 169.
104. Id. at 176 (emphasis added).
105. Id. at 185.
106. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
107. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 339.
108. Id. at 341.
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The defendant in Welsh initially had characterized his beliefs as non-
religious,' °9 but the Court was not influenced by this admission. The
Court was persuaded that the defendant's beliefs, however charac-
terized, held a place in the life of the defendant parallel to more tra-
ditional concepts of religious faith. 1 0 It is the nature of the belief and
the subjective value placed on that belief, then, rather than the label
given to it, that are important for purposes of the Military Service
Act's religious exception.
Although the conscientious objector cases illustrate how courts
approach the problem of defining religion, they involve interpretation
of a statute that provides more guidance than the first amendment's
mere reference to the free exercise of "religion." As a result of the
broad and ambiguous reference to religion in the first amendment,
courts have had to face what some consider to be extremely unor-
thodox claims under the heading of free exercise. In People v. Woody, '
the California Supreme Court held that the use of an illegal hallu-
cinogen by members of the Native American Church was a protected
religious practice. In contrast, a federal district court in United States
v. Kuch 1 2 rejected similar claims by a member of the Neo-American
Church. This purported religious organization was led by a "Chief
Boo Hoo" and the official songs of the church were "Puff, the Magic
Dragon" and "Row, Row, Row Your Boat." ' 3 The church motto,
printed on various items such as sweat shirts and sacramental pipes,
was "Victory over Horseshit!1 1 4 The Kuch court declined to recognize
the Neo-American Church as a religion for first amendment purposes,
stating, "It is clear that the desire to use drugs and to enjoy drugs
for their own sake, regardless of religious experience, is the coagulant
of this organization and the reason for its existence."'1 5
109. Welsh believed "the taking of life-anyone's life-to be morally wrong." Id. at 343
(quoting Appellant's brief). In filling out his conscientious objector application, he struck
through the word "religious" and later explained that his beliefs were formed "by reading in
the fields of history and sociology." Id. at 341 (quoting Appellant's Brief).
110. See id. at 343; see also United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965) (recognizing
that an individual's beliefs may qualify as sincere religious beliefs even though the individual
does not subscribe to a traditional religion).
111. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964). The California Supreme Court
relied on the federal constitution in deciding Woody. Thus, following Employment Division
v. Smith, the continued authority of Woody appears doubtful.
112. 288 F. Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1968); see also Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851 (5th
Cir. 1967) (upholding Dr. Timothy Leary's conviction for violations of federal criminal statutes
relating to the "psychedelic" drug marijuana and rejecting the defendant's free exercise claims),
cert. granted, 392 U.S. 903 (1968), rev'd on other grounds, 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
113. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. at 444.
114. Id. at 445.
115. Id. at 444.
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In defining religion to determine if a claim legitimately comes
under the free exercise clause, courts ultimately focus on one factor-
the sincerity of the individual. If the belief holds a sincere and mean-
ingful place in the individual's life, then courts seem willing to assume
that it could be labeled religious.116 In fact, for a court to inquire be-
yond the individual's sincerity in addressing a religious claim would
potentially violate the Supreme Court's proscription of questioning the
correctness of religious beliefs. Thus, as the focus of judicial inquiry,
the sincerity of an individual's religious beliefs must be considered
without regard to the value placed on those beliefs by others.
(2) Verity of Belief Beyond Judicial Province
Although courts must examine the religious nature of the claimed
beliefs and actions when presented with a free exercise claim, they
must not evaluate the correctness of the belief or the religion that sup-
ports the belief. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that
this issue is beyond the courts' authority. 117 The individual has the
right to be free of governmental intrusions into his mind: "Our whole
constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the
power to control men's minds.1118
In Thomas v. Review Board, 19 the Supreme Court stated that the
determination of what is or is not a religious belief or practice should
not depend on a "judicial perception" of the religious claims in ques-
tion. 120 Thomas involved a Jehovah's Witness who was denied state
unemployment benefits when he quit his job after being transferred
to a department that manufactured gun turrets for military tanks.
Thomas objected to participating in the production of war materials
on the basis of his religious faith.121 The Indiana Supreme Court held
that although Thomas described his reasons for quitting as religious,
the religious basis of his claimed belief was unclear, and therefore,
Thomas' decision was not sufficiently "religious" to merit protection
under the first amendment.'2 The United States Supreme Court, how-
ever, reversed the state court, holding that "religious beliefs need not
be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order
to merit First Amendment protection."'12
116. See supra notes 104-110 and accompanying text.
117. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564-66 (1969).
118. Id. at 565. Presumably, women's minds receive similar protection.
119. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
120. Id. at 714 (emphasis added).
121. Id. at 709.
122. Id. at 714.
123. Id.
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Thomas illustrates the Supreme Court's reluctance to debate the
efficacy of an individual's faith.'1 While maintaining that only relig-
ious beliefs are protected by the free exercise clause,1 25 the Court none-
theless stated:
Thomas drew a line, and it is not for us to say that the line he drew
was an unreasonable one. Courts should not undertake to dissect
religious beliefs because the believer admits that he is 'struggling'
with his position or because his beliefs are not articulated with the
clarity and precision that a more sophisticated person might em-
ploy. 26
The judicial task, then, is to evaluate the sincerity of the claimed re-
ligious conviction, 27 not the veracity of the claim nor the claim's con-
sistency with those of other adherents to that particular faith.'2 If the
first amendment is to provide genuine protection for an individual's
religious beliefs, courts must not intrude into the merits of those be-
liefs.
The Thomas decision is consistent with the Supreme Court's past
line of free exercise cases and the distinction drawn between belief and
conduct.' 29 In United States v. Ballard,'30 for example, the Supreme
Court recognized the absolute nature of the protections afforded to
religious beliefs as opposed to the qualified protection of religiously
motivated conduct. The Ballard Court held that in a criminal pros-
ecution for an alleged scheme to defraud based on representations of
religious doctrines and beliefs, "all questions concerning the truth or
falsity of the [defendants'] religious beliefs or doctrines" were prop-
erly withheld from the jury.' 3' The only proper question involved the
sincerity of the defendants' beliefs. The Court stated, "Men may be-
124. The majority in Employment Division v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990), chose not to
upset this well-established maxim, instead citing it as support for its argument against the
viability of requiring a compelling state interest standard. "It is no more appropriate for
judges to determine the 'centrality' of religious beliefs before applying a 'compelling interest'
test in the free exercise field, than it would be for them to determine the 'importance' of ideas
before applying the [same] test in the free speech field." Id. at 1604.
125. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 713.
126. Id. at 715.
127. Courts can evaluate whether claimed beliefs are held sincerely just as they determine
other questions of fact. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965) (the sincerity
of an individual's belief is a question of fact in determining a claim for military service
exemption by a conscientious objector).
128. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716. But see Walker v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 3d 112, 139,
763 P.2d 852, 870, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1, 19 (1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 905 (1989) (noting that
"resort to medicine does not constitute 'sin' for a Christian Scientist . . . , does not result in
etribution ... . and ... is not a matter of church compulsion").
129. See supra, Part I.A.(1).
130. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
131. Id. at 88.
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lieve what they cannot prove.... Many take their gospel from the
New Testament. But it would hardly be supposed that they could be
tried before a jury charged with the duty of determining whether those
teachings contained false representations."'1 2 An absolute freedom to
believe what one chooses necessarily must preclude others from de-
manding justifications for those protected thoughts.
Adding the proscription against inquiries into the correctness of
beliefs, the Supreme Court's free exercise cases provide the following
analytical scheme: (1) Only sincere, religious beliefs and practices are
shielded from state interference; (2) beliefs are completely beyond the
reach of state regulation; (3) actions motivated by those beliefs may
be burdened by state intrusion, provided the intrusion is merely in-
cidental to an otherwise valid state action; but (4) courts may not eval-
uate an individual's professed belief beyond questioning whether the
belief is sincerely held.
The Supreme Court's fundamental belief-conduct dichotomy is
central to judicial evaluations of religiously motivated treatment for
ill children. A parent's belief in the healing power of prayer is easily
distinguished from conduct motivated by that belief that impacts on
a child-witholding orthodox medical treatment, for instance. 33 But
though this distinction strikes an intuitive balance between the indi-
vidual's right to believe and the protection of third parties from the
effects of that individual freedom, its application ultimately has proven
disastrous for nontraditional and unpopular religious beliefs like faith
healing.
H. Religiously Motivated Treatment Decisions for Children
While under Employment Division v. Smith,134 states may no
longer need to show a compelling interest to restrict religiously mo-
tivated conduct outside the area of unemployment compensation,135
the Smith opinion implies that a "hybrid" claim involving free exercise
rights in conjunction with parental rights would continue to merit at
least some level of heightened protection. 36 Presumably, then, a par-
132. Id. at 86-87.
133. See infra text accompanying notes 153-163.
134. 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
135. See supra text accompanying notes 76-78, 82.
136. See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1601-02 (leaving open the possibility that a state would be
required to show a greater interest in the face of free exercise claims in conjunction with the
rights of parents); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233-34 (1972) (recognizing the strength-
ened first amendment claim when interests of parenthood combine with free exercise rights);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 518-21 (1925) (allowing parents to send their children
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ent wishing to treat her ill child with prayer would fall into this pro-
tected area, and the state's restriction of that religious conduct would
be valid only upon a showing of some heightened level of state interest.
When courts have faced issues regarding the health and well-being
of children in the past, states generally have been able to meet even
a compelling interest standard to justify limiting free exercise rights.'37
In Prince v. Massachusetts,"'3 although placing "the custody, care and
nurture" of children with the parents, 13 9 the United States Supreme
Court held that both religious and parental rights have limitations and
the state may invoke its power as parens patriae to place restrictions
on a parent's control over her child's activities. 14 Moreover, this ra-
tionale is entirely consistent with the Court's belief-conduct distinction
in the area of free exercise. A parent is free to believe as she wishes,
but when her actions affect her child, the state may infringe upon the
parent's first amendment rights in the interest of protecting the child's
well-being. 41 In this "no man's land" of competing rights and in-
terests, 142 the parent's provision of prayer and spiritual treatment to
her child, in lieu of orthodox medical treatment, approaches the
boundaries of protected first amendment free exercise.
Nonetheless, in allowing Laurie Walker's prosecution for criminal
negligence, the court in Walker v. Superior Court143 allowed the state
to restrict not only an individual's religiously motivated conduct, but
also her thoughts, convictions, and beliefs. The California Supreme
Court's decision in Walker illustrates the complexity of cases involving
religiously motivated treatment decisions for children. Under a Sher-
bert analysis, 44 balancing parental free exercise rights against a strong
to private schools: "it is not debatable that the parental right to guide one's child intellectually
and religiously is a most substantial part of the liberty and freedom of the parent."); supra
text accompanying notes 79-82.
137. See Note, Faith Healing Exemptions, supra note 3, at 252.
138. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
139. Id. at 166.
140. Id. Parens patriae "refers traditionally to [the] role of [the] state as sovereign and
guardian of persons under legal disability." BLACK'S LAw DICTONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990);
see also Note, Relief for the Neglected Child: Court-Ordered Medical Treatment in Non-
Emergency Situations, 22 SANTA CLARA L. Rav. 471, 472 (1982) (authored by Brian Hawes)
("The state, as parens patriae, is the ultimate protector of the rights of its citizen children.");
43 C.J.S. Infants § 5 (1978) ("A minor, deprived of parental care and control, is a ward of
the state, over whom the state may exercise its sovereign power of guardianship .... ).
141. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166-67; see also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963)
(actions prompted by religious beliefs subject to legislative restriction upon showing of
"compelling state interest").
142. Prince, 321 U.S. at 165.
143. 47 Cal. 3d 112, 763 P.2d 852, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 905
(1989).
144. The Walker majority cited Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), and Thomas v.
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state interest in the protection of children, the Walker court found that
the state interest in protecting children far outweighed the parental
right to protection of religious conduct. 145
A. Background on Faith Healing Prosecutions
States consistently have been willing to prosecute parents who
provide spiritual treatment for their children in lieu of traditional med-
ical care when the parents' methods have been ineffective and resulted
in death.146 The courts generally take the position that "an enlightened
society will not permit the great healing medium of modem medicine
and surgery to be denied to children, regardless of the conscientious
belief of their parents .... ,1 47 One commentator, however, has noted
the number of convictions of faith healing parents that have been over-
turned on technical grounds unrelated to the underlying charge of
manslaughter or neglect and has questioned whether this pattern re-
flects "an unstated judicial policy of sympathy." 14 Nonetheless, as
early as 1903 in People v. Pierson,149 a parent's conviction was af-
firmed after his infant child died of pneumonia when he relied on
"Divine healing" rather than seek medical care for her.150 Since then,
other courts similarly have rejected religious defenses of parents who
refuse medical treatment for their gravely ill children.15'
In addition to holding parents criminally liable, courts have taken
legal custody of ill children whose parents refuse to consent to medical
treatment for them based on religious objections.152 In State v. Per-
Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981), in applying what was in fact a Sherbert compelling interest-
least restrictive means analysis. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 139, 763 P.2d at 869, 253 Cal. Rptr.
at 18.
145. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 139, 763 P.2d at 869-70, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 18-19.
146. Ingram, State Interference with Religiously Motivated Decisions on Medical Treatment,
93 DICK. L. Rav. 41, 59 (1988). For a discussion of early approaches to the regulation of
prayer healing in England and'the United States, see Note, California's Prayer Healing, supra
note 4, at 397-400.
147. Ingram, supra note 146, at 59-60 (quoting Eggleston v. Landrum, 210 Miss. 645, 653,
50 So. 2d 364, 367 (1951)).
148. Note, Religious Beliefs, supra note 3, at 8; see also Note, Parental Failure, supra
note 13, at 874-76.
149. 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903).
150. Id. at 204, 68 N.E. at 244.
151. See, e.g., Walker v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 3d 112, 763 P.2d 852, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1
(1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3186 (1989); People v. Arnold, 66 Cal. 2d 438, 426 P.2d 515,
58 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1967); Craig v. State, 220 Md. 590, 155 A.2d 684 (1959); Owens v. State,
6 Okla. Crim. 110, 116 P. 345 (1911); Commonwealth v. Barnhart, 345 Pa. Super. 10, 497
A.2d 616 (1985), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 817 (1985).
152. Note, Faith Healing Exemptions, supra note 3, at 254-57.
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ricone,153 the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the appointment of
a guardian for the infant son of Jehovah's Witnesses when the parents
refused to grant permission for a blood transfusion. 15 4 The court noted
a New Jersey statute exempting the parents from criminal liability for
withholding medical treatment on religious grounds, but held, "lIlt
does not follow that because such persons are immune from criminal
prosecutions, the State is helpless in protecting children.' 155
Despite judicial willingness to use both civil and criminal devices
to protect children, states have begun to recognize faith healing sta-
tutorily. Almost all states currently have some form of spiritual heal-
ing exemption in statutes that require parents to provide necessary
medical care for their children. 156 The courts' application of these ex-
emptions illustrates the ultimate conflict between the parents' free ex-
ercise rights and the state's interest in protecting children. Courts must
determine whether the exemptions will immunize parents from crim-
inal liability absolutely or will provide only limited defenses. The Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court faced this issue in Walker v. Superior Court. 157
B. Statutory Exemption for Spiritual Treatment
Section 270 of the California Penal Code provides that a parent's
failure to provide certain necessities of life to her child constitutes a
misdemeanor.158 In Walker, the California Supreme Court held that
because of an explicit exemption in that statute, spiritual treatment
in lieu of orthodox medical treatment does not subject parents to crim-
inal liability under section 270.159 Nonetheless, it found no basis for
extending the exemption to the two felonies for which Laurie Walker
was charged-felony child endangerment and involuntary manslaugh-
ter. 160 The court relied in part on the absence of any shared objectives
between section 270 and the two felonies. Laurie Walker contended
that section 270 was not a fiscal support provision, but that its purpose
was "to protect children from serious injury.' 161 Because the man-
slaughter and child endangerment statutes of sections 192(b) and 273a
153. 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962).
154. Id. at 480, 181 A.2d at 760.
155. Id. at 478, 181 A.2d at 759.
156. See Clark, Religious Accomodation and Criminal Liability, 17 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
559, 560 n.5 (1990) (collecting statutes).
157. 47 Cal. 3d 112, 763 P.2d 852, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 905
(1989).
158. CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1988). For the text of § 270, see supra note 9.
159. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 122-23, 763 P.2d at 856-58, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 6-7.
160. Id. at 129, 763 P.2d at 862, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 11-12.
161. Id. at 125, 763 P.2d at 859, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
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shared this statutory purpose, Walker contended that the legality of
her conduct under section 270 necessarily created an exemption from
prosecution for those crimes as well.162 The majority in Walker, how-
ever, held that the principal objectives of section 270 were to provide
support for children and "to protect the public from the burden of
supporting a child who has a parent able to support him."'' 6 By thus
limiting the purpose of section 270, the court was able to avoid ap-
plication of the section 270 exemption to Walker's felony prosecu-
tions.'" Strangely, the majority found no inconsistency in its conclusion
that Walker might be protected from criminal liability for the mis-
demeanor, but not for the two felonies for which she was being pros-
ecuted. A parent's treatment of her child with prayer is lawful, as is
treatment with orthodox medicine. The faith healing parent, however,
must always be successful in curing her child or risk criminal pros-
ecution.
The Walker court examined the legislative history of the amend-
ments creating the section 270 exemption and determined that al-
though the legislature was aware that a possibility of prosecutions for
involuntary manslaughter and child endangerment remained, it had
chosen not to address that situation. 65 The court placed great weight
on the legislature's silence, particularly in light of staff reports that
brought the matter to the attention of the legislators.' The court con-
cluded that "considered silence is an insufficient basis to infer that
the Legislature, by amending a misdemeanor support provision, ac-
tually exempted from felony liability all parents who offer prayer alone
to a dying child."' 6 7
The court also rejected Laurie Walker's contention that appli-
cation of the section 270 exemption to sections 273a and 192(b) follows
from a general statutory recognition of faith healing in California.'"
162. Id. at 123-24, 763 P.2d at 858-59, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 7-8. When statutes relate to the
same subject or to the same class of persons, or share the same purpose, they are said to
stand in pari materia and one should be interpreted in light of the other. Id. at 124 n.4, 763
P.2d at 859 n.4, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 8 n.4.
163. Id. at 124, 763 P.2d at 859, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 8 (quoting People v. Sorensen, 68 Cal.
2d 280, 287, 437 P.2d 495, 500, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7, 12 (1968)). Contra Note, California Penal
Code's Child Neglect/Abandonment Statutes: Religious Freedom or Religious Persecution?,
25 ANrA CLARA L. Rav. 613, 617-21 (1985) (authored by Jenny Brown) [hereinafter Note,
Child Neglect/Abandonment Statutes] (concluding that § 273a, the felony child endangerment
statute, should be read to include the § 270 exemption).
164. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 126, 763 P.2d at 860, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 9.
165. Id. at 128, 763 P.2d at 862, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
166. Id. at 128-29, 763 P.2d at 862, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
167. Id. at 129, 763 P.2d at 862, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
168. Id. at 129-30, 763 P.2d at 862, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 12. Laurie Walker cited provisions
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The court found support for its contrary position in section 300 of
the California Welfare and Institutions Code, 169 which allows the ju-
venile court to take custody of a child whose health is endangered.
Section 300 defers to a parent's decision to provide treatment through
prayer; but in circumstances in which judicial intervention is "nec-
essary to protect the minor from suffering serious physical harm or
illness," the parents' interests must yield to the state's overriding in-
terest in the child's health. 170 The courts then will assume jurisdiction
over treatment decisions. The Walker court found in this section a
clear expression of legislative intent: "when a child's health is seriously
jeopardized, the right of a parent to rely exclusively on prayer must
yield." 171
The state clearly can limit the parent's right to engage in conduct
injurious to the child's health consistent with the first amendment. 7 2
But the fact that the state may limit a parent's religiously motivated
conduct to protect the health of children in no way implies that the
state may interfere with that parent's religious beliefs in a prosecution
of the Health and Safety Code exempting prayer practitioners and institutions from state
licensing requirements as well as Welfare and Institutions Code sections that accommodate
persons who choose to rely on prayer treatment. Id. at 129 n.9, 130 n.10, 763 P.2d at 863
nn.9-10, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 12 nn.9-10. The court found that these provisions did not represent
a statutory validation of prayer treatment for children. It rejected the contention that the
overall statutory scheme in California represents an endorsement of the reasonableness of
prayer treatment, holding instead that it merely shows "a willingness to accommodate religious
practice when children do not face serious physical harm." Id. at 138, 763 P.2d at 868, 253
Cal. Rptr. at 17-18.
169. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (West Supp. 1991). The statute provides in relevant
part:
Any minor who comes within any of the following descriptions is within the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may adjudge that person to be a dependent
child of the court:
(b) The minor has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the minor will suffer,
serious physical harm or illness, as a result of ... willful or negligent failure of the
parent or guardian to provide the minor with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or
medical treatment .... Whenever it is alleged that a minor comes within the
jurisdiction of the court on the basis of the parent's or guardian's willful failure to
provide adequate medical treatment or specific decision to provide spiritual treatment
through prayer, the court shall give deference to the parent's or guardian's medical
treatment, nontreatment, or spiritual treatment through prayer alone in accordance
with the tenets and practices of a recognized church or religious denomination, by
an accredited practitioner thereof, and shall not assume jurisdiction unless necessary
to protect the minor from suffering serious physical harm or illness.
Id.
170. Id.
171. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 133, 763 P.2d at 866, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
172. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 229-30 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944).
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under a theory of criminal negligence. Because section 270 makes the
spiritual treatment of children lawful conduct, 73 a prosecution for child
endangerment and involuntary manslaughter in these circumstances
rests on a theory of criminal negligence. 174 By definition criminal neg-
ligence requires an examination into the reasonableness of the defen-
dant's knowledge and beliefs, if only to conclude that they were
unreasonable.17 5
C. The Objective Standard of Criminal Negligence
Without extending the section 270 exemption, the Walker court
still could have protected Laurie Walker's free exercise rights by rec-
ognizing the conflict between its objective standard for criminal neg-
ligence and her absolute right to remain free from governmental
intrusion in the area of her religious beliefs. 176 Laurie Walker con-
tended that no reasonable jury could find her conduct criminally neg-
ligent. The court's dismissal of this assertion by the conclusory
statement that "criminal negligence must be evaluated objectively '1 77
illustrates the risk of defending a religious belief against an objective
examination. The truth is that the defendant was wrong; a "reason-
able" jury might well find her conduct criminally negligent if allowed
to judge that conduct by an objective standard of reasonableness. This
necessarily requires an examination of the reasonableness of her belief
that spiritual treatment would cure her child. By ignoring the nature
of the burden imposed on Walker's religious belief by such an ex-
amination, the court was able to avoid consideration of her subjective
religious beliefs in its judgment of her conduct.
Thus, it is not surprising that the Walker court found Laurie
Walker's conduct sufficiently culpable to sustain a conviction for ei-
ther felony child endangerment or involuntary manslaughter. 78 The
court relied on a rudimentary survey of criminal negligence cases in
California. For a definition of criminal negligence, the court looked
to People v. Penny.7 9 In Penny, the defendant operated a "face re-
juvenation" clinic and was convicted under section 192 of the Cali-
fornia Penal Code 80 for involuntary manslaughter based upon the
173. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
174. See Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 128, 763 P.2d at 861, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 10.
175. See id. at 135, 763 P.2d at 866-67, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 15-16.
176. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
177. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 136, 763 P.2d at 868, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
178. Id. at 137-38, 763 P.2d at 868-69, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 17-18.
179. 44 Cal. 2d 861, 285 P.2d 926 (1955).
180. For the relevant text of § 192, see supra note 6.
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accidental poisoning and death of a customer. 8' The Penny court re-
versed the defendant's conviction because it was based on criminal
negligence and, thus, the jury instruction on ordinary civil negligence
was erroneous. 8 2 The Walker court adopted that distinction and de-
scribed the sort of conduct required to constitute criminal negligence:
aggravated, culpable, gross, or reckless, that is, the conduct of the
accused must be such a departure from what would be the conduct
of an ordinarily prudent or careful man under the same circumstances
as to be incompatible with a proper regard for human life, or ...
a disregard of human life or an indifference to consequences. 183
Furthermore, the court continued, criminal negligence is evaluated
"pursuant to the general principles of negligence, the fundamental of
which is knowledge, actual or imputed, that the act of the slayer tended
to endanger life.' ' 84
Similarly, the Walker court cited People v. Peabody,'85 which held
that the standard of conduct condemned by section 273a(1), the felony
child endangerment statute, amounted to criminal negligence. 8 6 In
Peabody, the trial court held that if the defendant willfully caused or
permitted her baby to be placed in a dangerous situation, then a con-
viction under section 273a(1) could stand. 87 The California Supreme
Court reversed the defendant's conviction because the trial court failed
to instruct the jury on the proper criminal negligence standard, citing
the objective standard set out in Penny.88
The Walker court found further support for using an objective
standard for criminal negligence in People v. Burroughs.8 9 In Bur-
roughs; the court held that the defendant could be prosecuted for crim-
inally negligent involuntary manslaughter without any showing of intent
to harm. 90 Similarly, the Walker court did not imply that Laurie Walker
harbored any evil motives in the treatment of her daughter. In fact,
the court recognized that the "[d]efendant unquestionably relied on
prayer treatment as an article of genuine faith, the restriction of which
181. Penny, 44 Cal. 2d at 863-65, 285 P.2d at 928.
182. Id. at 880, 285 P.2d at 937.
183. Walker v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 3d 112, 135, 763 P.2d 852, 866, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1,
15-16 (1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 905 (1989) (citing Penny, 44 Cal. 2d at 879, 285 P.2d at
937).
184. Id., 763 P.2d at 867, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 16 (citing Penny, 44 Cal. 2d at 880, 285 P.2d
at 937).
185. 46 Cal. App. 3d 43, 119 Cal. Rptr. 780 (1975).
186. Id. at 45, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 780.
187. Id. at 46, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 781; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 273a(1) (West 1988).
188. Id. at 48, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 783.
189. 35 Cal. 3d 824, 678 P.2d 894, 201 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1984).
190. Burroughs, 35 Cal. 3d at 834, 678 P.2d at 901, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 326.
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would seriously impinge on the practice of her religion."19 By ignoring
Laurie Walker's intent, however, the court was able to compare her
situation to other criminal negligence cases in which the defendants
had not made free exercise claims. 19 It is in these comparisons that
the danger of the court's analysis becomes apparent. 93
The Walker court also relied on People v. Atkins,'94 which in-
volved a mother's conviction for involuntary manslaughter and felony
child endangerment after her child died from lack of medical care. The
Atkins court held that the mother's "failure to seek prompt medical
attention for [her son], rather than waiting several days," was suf-
ficient to support a finding of criminal negligence and thus supported
a conviction for involuntary manslaughter. 195 In reaching this conclu-
sion the Atkins court relied on evidence showing that the mother "knew
or should have known" the extent of her son's injuries. 96
Under this objective standard a parent is charged with the knowl-
edge of a reasonably prudent person that her child requires medical
attention; failure to secure treatment in such circumstances constitutes
criminal negligence. The Walker court's reliance on Atkins is mis-
placed, however, because in Atkins, the child victim was the object
of repeated physical abuse. Moreover, in addition to the manslaughter
and child endangerment convictions, there were convictions against the
mother for battery and against the mother's male companion (a co-
defendant) for second degree murder and infliction of corporal pun-
ishment. 97 Reviewing the trial court's convictions, the court of appeal
in Atkins was not certain on what ground the jury had based the moth-
er's involuntary manslaughter conviction: inflicting the actual injuries,
allowing the child to be injured by the boyfriend, or failing to seek
medical attention after the injuries occurred. 98 The court of appeal
simply noted that the jury found sufficient evidence to support the
conviction, if only in the mother's failure to take her son to a doctor. 99
That the Walker majority found Atkins analogous to Laurie
Walker's case illustrates the precariousness of the first amendment free
exercise guarantees if courts apply an objective negligence standard
191. Walker v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 3d 112, 139, 763 P.2d 852, 869-70, 253 Cal. Rptr.
1, 19 (1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 905 (1989).
192. Id. at 134-38, 763 P.2d at 866-69, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 15-18.
193. See infra notes 200-206 and accompanying text.
194. 53 Cal. App. 3d 348, 125 Cal. Rptr. 855 (1975).
195. Id. at 360, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 855.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 352-53, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 855.
198. Id. at 360, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 862-63.
199. Id.
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to cases involving religiously motivated conduct. Comparing Atkins,
the Walker court stated, "When divorced of her subjective intent, the
alleged conduct of defendant here is essentially indistinguishable.''200
This statement begs the question. It is Walker's subjective intent, or
rather her constitutionally protected religious belief in the power of
prayer as a healer, that distinguishes the prosecution of the mother
in Atkins from that of Laurie Walker. The Walker court's logic is
somewhat like comparing a murder prosecution following an unpro-
voked drive-by shooting, with a murder prosecution following an at-
tempted rape in which the assailant was shot in the struggle with his
victim. In the first scenario, the defendant has no recognized defense
under the law. But in the second scenario, the victim can claim self-
defense and avoid conviction. Walker's constitutionally mandated
freedom from government restriction of her religious beliefs is at least
as strong a defense as that of the assault victim.
In light of the physical abuse in Atkins, the mother's failure to
seek any treatment for her child was at least criminally negligent; she
made no attempt to heal her son by orthodox medical treatment or
prayer. In other words, she had no legally recognized objection to
being judged by an objective standard. But Laurie Walker sincerely
believed that she was doing everything in her power to help her daugh-
ter, a belief grounded in her constitutionally protected religious faith.
In support of her claim that no reasonable jury could find her
conduct criminally negligent, Laurie Walker cited People v. Rodri-
guez,20 in which the California Supreme Court reversed a mother's
involuntary manslaughter conviction after the court found that the
actions of the mother in leaving her children alone were not suffi-
ciently reckless to amount to criminal negligence.m Continuing to judge
Walker's conduct without regard for her religious beliefs, the Walker
court distinguished Rodriguez, finding that "the failure of defendant
[Walker] to seek medical attention for a child who sickened and died
over a 17-day period .. . [was] plainly more egregious than the de-
cision of Mrs. Rodriguez to leave her children alone at home for an
afternoon. "203
But in Rodriguez, the defendant's two-year-old died in a fire that
broke out while her children were at home alone and the defendant
was in a bar. 2 4 Even more disturbing, the defendant in Rodriguez had
200. Walker v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 3d 112, 137, 763 P.2d 852, 868, 253 Cal. Rptr. I,
17 (1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 905 (1989).
201. 186 Cal. App. 2d 433, 8 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1960).
202. Id. at 440-41, 8 Cal. Rptr. at 868-69.
203. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 138, 763 P.2d at 869, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
204. Rodriguez, 186 Cal. App. 2d at 435-36, 8 Cal. Rptr. at 865.
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left the house before 4:00 p.m. and was still away when the fire killed
her son some time after 10:00 p.m.205 That the Walker court found
Laurie Walker more culpable than the mother in Rodriguez illustrates
why unpopular religious beliefs must be protected. Because the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court found Laurie Walker's belief that prayer and
spiritual treatment would heal her daughter objectively unreasona-
ble,2 it found no reason to block her prosecution. If the court had
recognized that such a prosecution necessarily would violate an area
for which the free exercise clause gives absolute protection, her re-
ligious belief, then the question of objective reasonableness never would
have been reached.
Thus, having decided that the section 270 exemption for spiritual
treatment would not apply to felony child endangerment and invol-
untary manslaughter,"" the California Supreme Court treated Walk-
er's prosecution just as it would any other manslaughter or child
endangerment case. The court outlined clear precedent establishing
that criminal negligence is determined by an objective standard.M For
the majority, the only remaining question would rest with the jury:
Was Walker's failure to seek medical care for her daughter during
seventeen days of illness such a departure from the conduct of a rea-
sonably prudent person in those circumstances as to be incompatible
with a proper regard for human life? 2° Application of this objective
standard, however, raises several constitutional concerns in the area
of faith healing.
III. The Incompatibility of an Objective Standard with Free
Exercise
By divorcing the question of Laurie Walker's subjective intent
from its discussion of her first amendment free exercise rights-thereby
ignoring her belief in the power of prayer as a healer-the Walker
court avoided addressing the violation of those rights.210 An objective
standard allows the trier of fact to judge the defendant either by ef-
fectively denying the protected religious beliefs that motivated the con-
duct or by determining the reasonableness of those beliefs. The Walker
205. Id.
206. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 138, 763 P.2d at 869, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
207. See supra notes 160-171 and accompanying text.
208. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 136-37, 763 P.2d at 868, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
209. See id. at 138, 763 P.2d at 868-69, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
210. See supra Part II.C.; cf. Clark, supra note 156, at 577-79 (discussing constitutional
limitations on jury determinations in spiritual healing prosecutions-inquiries into the reason-
ableness of a religious belief not permitted).
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court opened its discussion of the defendant's constitutional claims by
acknowledging that although the first amendment "absolutely protects
religious belief, religiously motivated conduct 'remains subject to reg-
ulation for the protection of society.' 211 In essence, by mischarac-
terizing the intrusion of a criminal negligence prosecution as only
burdening religious conduct, the Walker court was able to define Lau-
rie Walker's belief out of existence. Walker's spiritual treatment of
Shauntay was clearly conduct motivated by her beliefs, and the court
easily found that the state could restrict that conduct through criminal
prosecution. On its face, the California court's decision appears con-
sistent with the United States Supreme Court's application of the be-
lief-conduct distinction.
Quoting from Prince v. Massachusetts,21 2 the Walker court stated
its basis for rejecting Laurie Walker's free exercise claims: "Parents
may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they
are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children
before they have reached the age of full legal discretion when they can
make that choice for themselves. ' 213 The court characterized the issue
narrowly: the state is regulating the actions of the defendant in an area
of compelling interest, that of securing the welfare of innocent chil-
dren. It acknowledged the sincere nature of the defendant's religious
beliefs and the significant infringement that its decision represents, but
found that the "[i]mposition of felony liability for endangering or
killing an ill child by failing to provide medical care furthers an interest
of unparalleled significance: the protection of the very lives of Cal-
ifornia's children.5 214
The Walker court's application of Prince is misplaced. Prince un-
deniably acknowledged the power of the state to limit parental au-
thority "in things affecting the child's welfare."' 2 5 Relying on Reynolds
v. United States,2 6 the Prince court held that the state's authority to
regulate the conduct of children is not overriden merely because the
parent claims a religious right to control her child's conduct.2 7 But
Prince merely demonstrated the compelling interest of the state in pro-
tecting children: "The state's authority over children's activities is
211. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 139, 763 P.2d at 869, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 18 (quoting Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940)).
212. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
213. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 139, 763 P.2d at 870, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 19 (citing Prince, 321
U.S. at 170).
214. Id. at 139, 763 P.2d at 869, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
215. Prince, 321 U.S. at 167.
216. 98 U.S. 145 (1978).
217. Prince. 321 U.S. at 166.
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broader than over like actions of adults. ' 218 The defendant in Prince
was convicted of violating a state child labor law when she allowed
her nine-year-old niece to distribute Watchtower magazines. 219 That
state law did not involve an intrusion into the defendant's beliefs; she
was not charged with any knowledge of the reasonableness of her con-
duct.22 Thus, although Prince allowed restrictions on the defendant's
religious practices in the face of a compelling state interest to protect
children, it does not follow that this same interest would justify the
intrusion into beliefs represented by the application of an objective
criminal negligence standard in Walker.
A. Balancing Competing Interests
In light of the state's compelling interest in protecting the health
and welfare of children, a result that completely protects a parent's
free exercise rights at the child's expense is unacceptable. Nonetheless,
decimating free exercise rights in the interest of protecting children is
no less unacceptable. As the court pointed out in Walker, there are
two alternative approaches to protect children whose parents withhold
orthodox medical treatment on religious grounds. The state can in-
stitute civil dependency proceedings to assume control over treatment
decisions, or when the state is not aware of the danger to a child until
she has suffered serious harm or death, it can impose criminal liability
on the parent. 221
Finding that the imposition of criminal liability was the least re-
strictive means available to protect children, the Walker court ex-
pressed its opinion that civil dependency proceedings are far more
intrusive on parental interests than the application of criminal laws.22
Although the defendant and the Christian Science Church argued to
the contrary, the court concluded, "it is not clear that parents would
prefer to lose custody of their children pursuant to a disruptive and
invasive judicial inquiry than to face privately the prospect of criminal
liability." 22 Such a subjective inquiry into parents' preferences may
have no adequate resolution, but constitutional standards exist by which
the alternative intrusions must be measured. Each intrusion must be
218. Id. at 168.
219. Id. at 159-63.
220. See id. at 162-63.
221. See Walker v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 3d 112, 133-34, 763 P.2d 852, 865-66, 253
Cal. Rptr. 1, 14-15 (1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 905 (1989); accord Ingrain, supra note 146,
at 57; Note, Parental Failure, supra note 13, at 885.
222. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 134, 763 P.2d at 866, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
223. Id. at 140, 763 P.2d at 870, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 19-20.
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examined in the context of the free exercise rights of the parent. Again,
the Walker court was asking the wrong question. Because a prose-
cution based upon an objective standard of criminal negligence vio-
lates the absolute protection of the defendant's religious beliefs, the
extent of the restriction on her belief is immaterial.
If a court intervenes and orders medical treatment for a child,
the parent's free exercise rights have been infringed to the extent that
the state has interrupted her religiously motivated conduct.2 While
potentially interfering with a parent's free exercise rights, such actions
by the state are directed at the parent's religiously motivated conduct
in pursuit of what is clearly a compelling state interest.25 This is clearly
acceptable under the established belief-conduct distinction of the United
States Supreme Court's free exercise decisions. 226
If the state imposes criminal liability based on an objective crim-
inal negligence standard in the event that a child suffers serious illness
or death, however, then the state is not simply interfering with the
religious conduct of the parent; the state effectively is taking the par-
ent's belief from her. The state has said to that parent, "You may
not believe because what you put faith in is unreasonable." This in-
trusion represents an unmatched attack on the most initmate of all
individual preserves: one's thoughts and convictions regarding life and
death, creation and infinity.
The line that the Supreme Court rhetorically has drawn between
an individual's personal convictions and her outward expression of
those beliefs through her conduct is crucial. In Reynolds v. United
States,"2 7 the Supreme Court posed the obvious question for this in-
herent conflict: "Suppose one believed that human sacrifices were a
necessary part of religious worship. . . ?"2 The Reynolds Court rec-
ognized that a line had to be drawn, and the Court since has held
224. One commentator contends that any theoretical distinction between imposing criminal
sanctions and ordering medical treatment is without practical significance. See Ingram, supra
note 146, at 60. The result is the same in either case: "the parents' right to freely exercise
their religion, including the right to determine the religious beliefs and practices of their
children, is violated by state intervention." Id.; see also id. at 61-64 (state-mandated medical
treatment over parents' religious objections involves the state deciding that physical life on
earth has a higher value than spiritual life thereafter which is a violation of the first
amendment); cf. Note, Religious Beliefs, supra note 3, at 396-98 (questioning whether there is
any real distinction between "faith" and "healing").
225. After Employment Division v. Smith, the requirement that the state show a compelling
interest is subject to serious doubt. See supra notes 70-88 and accompanying text. Nonetheless,
it is certain that the protection of the health of children would meet any lesser standard
following Smith. See supra notes 137-142 and accompanying text.
226. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1599 (1990).
227. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
228. Id. at 166.
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steadfastly to the Reynolds belief-conduct framework. An individual's
religious belief in the necessity of human sacrifice is absolutely pro-
tected under the free exercise clause of the constitution; however, her
conduct motivated by that belief-the act of human sacrifice-may
be restricted by the-state. As one court has noted, "presumably, no
court would hesitate to enjoin the sacrifice of a child to a volcano
god." 229 But significantly, if the state law provides that the actual con-
duct of physically throwing another person into a volcano is legal, and
then in a later prosecution for criminal negligence claims that a rea-
sonable person would have known that a volcano would cause death,
the absolute constitutional protection of religious belief would be vi-
olated. Because the conduct was legal, the criminal law is left only
to judge the knowledge and beliefs of the defendant in choosing that
conduct.
Thus, while the state undoubtedly has a right to take actions to
protect the health and welfare of children, if we are to preserve the
area of religious belief from state intrusion, the methods with which
the state chooses to protect children cannot be unchallengeable. Be-
cause the conduct of a parent who chooses to treat her child with prayer
only becomes "criminal" at the point when a reasonable person would
have sought orthodox medical treatment,2 any judgment of her cul-
pability necessarily compares her belief in prayer as a healer against
what a "reasonable person" would have believed. And if the trier of
fact determines that the parent's religious belief was unreasonable, she
will be convicted. The focus of such an inquiry is not on the parent's
conduct; rather, the focus is on whether a reasonable person would
have believed her conduct to be the proper course. If a reasonable
person would have believed in the power of prayer as a healer, then
the parent's decision not to seek medical care cannot be unreasona-
ble. 1 It is inescapable, then, that a criminal negligence prosecution
in these circumstances, based on a theory of objective reasonableness,
229. In re Jensen, 54 Or. App. 1, 7, 633 P.2d 1302, 1306 (1981).
230. See Walker v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 3d 112, 135-38, 763 P.2d 852, 866-69, 253
Cal. Rptr. 1, 15-18 (1988); see also id. at 142, 763 P.2d at 872, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 21 (holding
due process guarantee of notice satisfied in that "'[t]he matter of degree' that persons relying
on prayer treatment must estimate rightly is the point at which their course of conduct becomes
criminally negligent").
231. This discussion is not meant to imply that the parent who chooses to treat her ill
child with prayer should be judged by a reasonable "believer in faith healing" standard. Such
a standard would frustrate the prohibition against courts inquiring into the truth of a religion
or religious belief. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981). Instead, it is meant
to illustrate the wrongness of the Walker court's claim that an objective standard for criminal
negligence only judges conduct. See Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 137, 138-40, 763 P.2d at 867, 253
Cal. Rptr. at 17.
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violates the defendant's free exercise rights because it intrudes into an
area of absolute protection-her religious belief.
B. Hazards of a Merely Rhetorical Belief-Conduct Distinction
The Supreme Court consistently has held that religious beliefs are
absolutely protected from state intrusion.2 32 Individuals are free to think
and believe what they wish; free from government compulsion or fear
of government sanction: "Government may neither compel affirma-
tion of a repugnant belief.., nor penalize... individuals or groups
because they hold religious views abhorrent to the authorities . . . . 23
Religiously motivated conduct, however, has never received absolute
protection.2 14 To hold otherwise, the Court has acknowledged, would
invite chaos. 23 5
Because of its intuitive appeal, the belief-conduct framework has
survived over 100 years of constitutional rhetoric. The focus on in-
dividual rights in our Constitution places a high premium on personal
autonomy: for example, freedom from intrusion into one's home and
one's person.23 6 Thus, it is not surprising that in the area of free ex-
ercise, the Supreme Court has felt compelled to preserve the indivi-
dual's absolute right of freedom from incursions into her mind. Yet,
because the potential for disorder is easy to imagine in a nation in
which all conduct in the name of religion is immune from government
regulation, the Court's reduced protection for religiously motivated
conduct is equally unsurprising.
Nonetheless, although the Court has rhetorically carved out an
area of absolute protection for religious belief, ultimately free exercise
rights are vulnerable to interference at all levels. Laurie Walker's pros-
ecution for criminal negligence illustrates the danger of a distinction
between belief and conduct that does not go beyond rhetoric. By ig-
noring Walker's subjective belief, the California Supreme Court was
able to characterize her prosecution for involuntary manslaughter and
felony child endangerment as a valid intrusion into religiously mo-
232. See, e.g., Employment Division v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1599 (1990); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 219 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878).
233. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402 (citations omitted).
234. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1600; see aLso Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166 (indicating that the
government can interfere with religion to prevent human sacrifices as part of religious
ceremonies or to prevent wives from burning themselves upon their husbands' funeral "piles"
as exercises of religion).
235. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1605 (citing Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166-67).
236. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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tivated conduct. And if the state is still required to show a compelling
interest, an unlikely possibility after Smith, it is doubtful one could
find a more compelling concern than the protection of children.2 7
Professor Tribe denies that there is any real distinction between
religious belief and religiously motivated conduct.2 8 He may be cor-
rect, if only in the application of that distinction, but what he derives
from rejecting the constitutional rhetoric is an unacceptable conclu-
sion. To say that the only absolute free exercise protection is the right
not to be "brainwashed" by the government2 9 is to endorse the results
of Walker. The scope of free exercise protection afforded religious
beliefs would be narrowed to the point of insignificance. The dutiful
rhetoric of an absolutely protected religious belief would have no
meaning, and the Court's belief-conduct distinction would be made
impotent. The coercion standard of Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cem-
etery Protection Association ° would become the individual's only
protection from state intrusion into her religious practices and beliefs.
Because the state did not force Laurie Walker to modify her religious
beliefs, but rather merely refused to exempt her conduct from a neutral
criminal law, its intrusion would be constitutional.
By applying an objective standard of reasonableness to the re-
ligiously motivated conduct of parents with a sincere belief in faith
healing, however, the courts interfere with belief directly. The conduct
is over. By definition, the question focuses only on the parent's belief:
Was it objectively reasonable to believe prayer would heal her child?
Only if the trier of fact concludes that it was reasonable to believe
in prayer's power to heal, could the parent meet this objective stan-
dard. As the California Supreme Court betrayed its predisposition to-
ward orthodoxy,2 1 so we can expect other "reasonable" persons to
react similarly to unfamiliar and nontraditional religious beliefs.
The California Supreme Court's treatment of Laurie Walker's
claims illustrates the importance of maintaining the vitality of the pro-
237. Justice Scalia proffered what Justice O'Connor termed a "parade of horribles,"
Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1612-13 (O'Connor, J., concurring), that would attend the Court's
indulgence in "the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to religious objectors,
every regulation of conduct that does not protect an interest of the highest order." Id. at
1605. Perhaps significantly, he included in that list "constitutionally required religious exemp-
tions from ... health and safety regulation such as manslaughter and child neglect laws." Id.
(citations omitted).
238. L. TRm, supra note 18, at 1184.
239. Id.
240. 485 U.S. 439 (1988); see supra text iccompanying notes 63-69.
241. Although noting that this question was "in the exclusive province of the jury," the
Walker court could not help but comment on the "egregious" nature and "objective unrea-
sonableness" of Walker's conduct. Walker v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 3d 112, 138, 763 P.2d
852, 869, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1, 18 (1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 905 (1989).
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hibition against judicial inquiries that go beyond determining the sin-
cerity of an individual's religious belief. To be deserving of first
amendment protection, those beliefs need not be logical or even com-
prehensible to others. In Walker, the court demonstrates that to hold
otherwise protects only accepted, traditional religious beliefs-those
least in need of the first amendment.
Conclusion
This Note does not argue that the California Supreme Court was
wrong in refusing to extend the section 270 exemption to spiritual
treatment prosecutions for involuntary manslaughter and felony child
endangerment, as a matter of statutory construction. Nonetheless, in
upholding a prosecution under a criminal negligence theory, the Walker
court violated the one area of absolute protection under the free ex-
ercise clause of the first amendment-religious belief. In the interest
of protecting the welfare of children, the state undeniably may restrict
the religiously motivated conduct of faith healing parents, but that is
not what the court did in Walker. The court's decision in Walker il-
lustrates the precarious position of unfamiliar and even unpopular
religious beliefs in our society. Because the court found Laurie Walk-
er's belief in spiritual treatment objectively unreasonable, it was un-
willing to recognize the interference with religious belief inherent in
a prosecution for criminal negligence under these circumstances.
The exemption in section 270, recognized by the Walker court,
'accommodates" the religious practices of parents who choose to treat
their ill children with prayer rather than orthodox medicine. But after
Walker, it is clear that the accommodation for religious conduct in
that section does not protect the underlying beliefs motivating that
conduct. It is not enough to argue that the "belief" impacts on in-
nocent third parties. The extremely wide opportunity for state re-
striction on a faith healing parent's conduct was addressed by the
legislature in section 270 and in statutory provisions allowing state
intervention and compelled medical treatment of endangered children.
The California Supreme Court's mischaracterization of a prosecution
for involuntary manslaughter and felony child endangerment under
a criminal negligence theory as restricting only conduct defines ab-
solutely protected religious belief out of existence. The United States
Supreme Court's consistent distinction between religious beliefs and
religious conduct becomes mere constitutional rhetoric and Professor
Tribe's uninspiring theory is proven correct; the only absolute right
to religious beliefs-an individual's most intimate inner thoughts and
convictions-is the right not to be "brainwashed" by the state.
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